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Abstract— Governments around the world are expending
considerable time and resources framing strategies and policies
to deliver energy security. The term ‘energy security’ has
quietly slipped into the energy lexicon without any meaningful
discourse about its meaning or assumptions. An examination
of explicit and inferred definitions finds that the concept is
inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature having
multiple dimensions and taking on different specificities
depending on the country (or continent), timeframe or energy
source to which it is applied. But what does this mean for
policymakers? Can traditional policy approaches be used to
address the problem of energy security or does its’ polysemic
qualities mean that it should be treated as a ‘wicked’ problem?
To answer this question, the paper assesses energy security
against nine commonly cited characteristics of wicked policy
problems and finds strong evidence of ‘wickedness’.
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I. INTRODUCTION
s the debate about climate change has intensified, the
matter of energy supply security has been eclipsed.
Governments around the world have, however, been
implementing for some time an array of policies directed at
improving energy security. What is meant by the term ‘energy
security’ and are there any implications for policymakers?
The next section of the paper considers the nature of
energy security in light of the post World War 2 context in
which the term’s usage has evolved and the wide range of
different energy security definitions, explicit and inferred,
increasingly apparent in recent decades. This examination
leads to a policy conundrum as to whether the problem of
energy security should be addressed with traditional policy
approaches or treated as a complex, seemingly intractable
‘wicked’ policy problem. To shed some light on this issue, the
paper discusses nine commonly-cited characteristics of
‘wicked’ problems and assesses if any are attributable to
energy security. A concluding section discusses the
implications of the findings.
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II. THE NATURE OF ENERGY SECURITY
The term ‘energy security’ has become ubiquitous to
contemporary discussion about energy issues. The term is most
commonly found embedded in discussion framed around a
handful of notions which denote unimpeded access or no
planned interruptions to fuel sources, not relying on a limited
number of fuel sources, not being tied to a particular
geographic region for fuel sources, abundant energy resources,
an energy supply which can withstand external shocks, and/or
some form of energy self-sufficiency.
The term’s blithe appearance throughout a wide range of
reports and documents issued by government and
supranational organisations, and academic discourse, has been
rarely accompanied by discussion or explanation of the notions
which underpin its meaning. The term has quietly slipped into
the energy lexicon and assumed a relatively prominent position
without any meaningful discourse about its meaning or
assumptions. Yet governments around the world have
expended considerable time and resources framing strategies
and policies to deliver energy security.
Of the limited definitional discussion that has ensued, it has
been more peripheral than centre stage and often, the meaning
attributed has been more implicit than explicitly stated. Those
definitions that can be deduced, or are readily apparent, fall
into one of two categories. The first category has the narrower
focus around market supply and energy availability at market
price. The second category is far broader taking into account a
number of dimensions. The evolution of this definitional
dichotomy is evident if first we consider the context in which
the term ‘energy security’ has appeared before proceeding to
‘unpack’ the available definitions or their apparitions.
A. Energy’s political, economic and social context post
World War 2
Post World War 2 many countries, particularly those
comprising the OECD, became strongly reliant on Middle East
oil as an energy source. Oil was relatively abundant and cheap
until the oil price shocks of the 1970s. This led to a view of
energy security as synonymous with the need to reduce
dependence on oil consumption [1]. This fossil fuel had
become integral to the world’s post-war economic growth
trajectory particularly through the transport sector.
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The global economic crisis of the 1970s led to strident
criticism of government intervention and regulation. By the
1980s the need for greater competition and less government
involvement was strongly advocated for network sectors
(especially electricity, gas and telecommunications) which had
been traditionally dominated by government monopolies.
Considerable restructuring of energy markets around the world
has subsequently occurred and, in electricity’s case, at an
astonishing pace [2: 16-26]. Competition has been injected
through the breaking up of vertically integrated monopolies,
pricing and access regulation of monopoly networks, and the
creation of new trading markets. This restructuring has not
only been promoted by individual country governments but
actively encouraged by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, and international trading
agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the subsequent General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS).
The late twentieth century emergence of a global market for
liquified natural gas (LNG) has not only expanded available
fuel sources but also the geographic locations of energy
supplies. Concurrently China and India have become major
energy importers. More recently, global oil and gas prices
have escalated and remained high, compared to their levels in
the 1990s. The possibility of serious energy supply
interruptions has been heightened with political instability in
supplier countries (e.g. oil supplies from Iraq) and the
increasing disruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe
given the levels of energy import dependence around the
world. Risks to the energy supply chain infrastructure have
also come to the fore with the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks in the United States [3] and natural events such as
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2009 floods and bushfires
in north-eastern and south-eastern Australia.
Events such as a rapid escalation in oil prices, disruption of
gas supplies to Europe during freezing winter temperatures,
electricity blackouts following hurricanes or other severe
natural disasters, tend to focus public and media attention on
energy supply issues and measures taken by governments to
overcome short-term supply disruptions. This also was the
focus of energy security strategies following the 1970s oil
disruptions. But today's energy supply systems are far more
complex than a few decades ago. For example, cross-border
pipelines and strategic transport channels feature strongly,
China and India have become major energy importers, there
is an increasing reliance on an ever-smaller group of oil and
gas suppliers, financial markets and energy markets are
closely linked, and technology has created interdependencies
between electricity and oil refining as well as natural gas
processing. Energy markets are exemplars of liberalisation,
fossil fuels dominate our growing energy dependence, most
countries will never be energy self-sufficient and energy
consumption contributes around 80% to global greenhouse
gas emissions.
Total world energy consumption is projected to rise by 50%
in the 25 year period to 2030 without fundamental policy
changes and major supply constraints. Even more rapid growth
in greenhouse gas emissions is projected. International
organisations have claimed current energy supply and
consumption trends are environmentally, economically and
socially unsustainable [4].
Energy security is high on the policy agenda of the
developed and developing world, and supranational
organisations such as the European Commission (EC), World
Economic Forum, OECD, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
G8. The European Union (EU), the United Kingdom and
Japan, to name a few, have spent considerable resources
developing energy security strategies.
But what is ‘energy security’?
B. Definitions of energy security
The literature is marked by a very dominant focus on
securing supplies of oil and gas (For example, see: [4]-[8]).
The literature is also notably marked by ‘vapid abstractions‘
from a “foreign-policy cottage industry that obsesses about the
need for nations and their diplomats to worry about and
attempt to manage petroleum markets” [9]. Yet the world’s
most dominant form of energy supply is from electricity
making it critical to any country’s energy security and
warranting attention [10].
Bohi and Toman [11: 1094] state that “energy security can
be defined in various ways” although their focus is limited to
“economic issues related to the behaviour of markets”.
Subsequently they define energy insecurity “as the loss of
economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the
price or availability of energy” [12: 1] Some years earlier, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) defined energy security as
an “adequate supply of energy at a reasonable cost” [13: 29]
and later posited that “energy security is simply another way of
avoiding market distortions” [14: 23].
This IEA definition of energy security in market terms has
been consistently restated and most recently expressed as
“energy security always consists of both a physical
unavailability component and a price component, [but] the
relative importance of these depends on market structure” [15:
32]. A similar approach is mirrored by [16]-[19] and [20: 237]
who suggests that the concept is centred on notions of supply
‘reliability’ and ‘adequacy’ at ‘reasonable’ market-determined
prices.
The logic which underpins these ‘market-centric’ definitions
goes something like this: as a consequence of the
‘liberalisation’ of energy markets, energy security [and
insecurity] is a market outcome, determined by the operation
of the market and thus can only be defined in market terms –
particularly supply (physical availability) and price. Continuity
of physical supply – often described in terms of availability,
reliability, relative shortage or complete disruption – across
the total supply chain assumes a singular, unparalleled
importance within this definition of the concept.
A security of supply risk refers to a shortage in energy supply,
either a relative shortage, i.e. a mismatch in supply and demand
inducing price increases, or a partial or complete disruption of
energy supplies [21: 13].
Therefore the purpose of energy security strategies is to
overcome “situations when energy markets do not function
properly … [and] should be mostly aimed at ‘making markets
work’“ [22]. Competitive markets and ‘independent’
regulation are considered the “most effective way of delivering
secure and reliable energy supplies” [17: 8]. A corollary of this
view comes strongly to the fore in the UK Government’s
energy approach. The ‘right’ level of security [i.e. continuity
of supply] “depends on the balance between the costs and the
benefits of increasing security … [and] is left to the market as
suppliers are better placed than Government or the Regulator
to understand the value that their different customers place on
security of supply” [17: 17).
A further corollary of this market-centric conceptualisation
of energy security has been successive endeavours at its
‘operationalisation’. The first step was the ‘translation’ of the
market-centric definition into short-term (operational) and
long-term (adequacy) threats to supply disruptions based on
sources of energy supplies, and subsequent transit, storage and
delivery [14], [23]. The second step was quantification of
these risks. “To be analytically helpful, a measure of supply
security needs to be quantifiable” [24: 2], “can be used as a
measure to indicate a desired state” [21: 13] and can “measure
risks and policy effectiveness” [25].
Quantitative measurement of ‘market-centric’ energy
security risks has been proceeding since the early part of this
decade. Since 2002 the UK Government has published
security-of-supply indicators which range across three
categories of supply and demand forecasts, market signals (e.g.
forward prices for gas and electricity) and market response
(planned major new investments). The Clingendael
International Energy Programme has developed, in relation to
the EU, a Crisis Capability Index (for short-term supply
interruption) and a Supply/Demand Index [21][26]. The IEA
[15] has also proposed two energy security measurement
‘tools’ of market power (the price component) and pipe-based
import dependence (physical availability). Another example of
this quest for quantification has been an extension of the
Shannon-Wiener index which is more commonly used to
measure biological diversity [27].
Broader definitions of energy security are observable
which embrace dimensions other than market supply and
market price. For example, the EC’s Green Paper Towards a
European strategy for the security of energy supply stated:
energy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the well-
being of its citizens and the proper functioning of the economy,
the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on
the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers
(private and industrial), while respecting environmental
concerns and looking towards sustainable development …
Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-
sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims to reduce the
risks linked to such dependence [28: 1-2, emphasis added).
The hazards posed to each of these dimensions of energy
security are identified, by the Green Paper, as physical,
economic, social and environmental risks. Moreover, it is
recognised that these risks will not be ameliorated or
prevented without government intervention - through policy
and/or regulatory action – given the complex institutional
arrangements which guarantee the existence and functioning of
contemporary energy markets.
A similar view is expressed in the European Parliament’s
response to this Green Paper which highlights notions of
adequate capacity to meet demand, and availability through
source diversification and many suppliers. The Parliament’s
response stresses Europe’s high oil import dependence,
proposes a reduction in transport’s demand for oil but
contends that dependence on imports of energy fuels “is
neither necessarily a bad thing nor economically inefficient
provided the sources are diverse, no one supplier is dominant
and we can produce sufficient goods and services to pay for
them” [29: 17].
The dimensions of availability, affordability, adequate
capacity and sustainability are echoed by the Asia Pacific
Energy Research Centre [30] and annual issues of the World
Energy Assessment which defines energy security as “the
availability of energy at all times in various forms, in sufficient
quantities and at affordable prices without unacceptable or
irreversible impact on the environment” [7: 42, emphasis
added]. These latter assessments distinguish between short and
long term energy supply interruptions, and stress the need for
diversification of local and imported energy sources to keep
pace with expected growth in demand [For example: 1]. The
APERC’s energy security definition of:
the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy
resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the
energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the
economic performance of the economy [30: 6]
places the concept firmly within the context of the broader
economy. It also clearly infers the desirability for government
action should economic performance be jeopardised by
insufficient, unsustainable and unaffordable market provision
of energy.
C. Multiple aspects of energy security
A number of fundamental aspects about the expression
‘energy security’ are discernible from the discussion thus far.
First, an inherent feature of energy security is about the
management of risk – the risk of interrupted, unavailable
energy supplies; the risk of insufficient capacity to meet
demand; the risk of unaffordable energy prices; the risk of
reliance on unsustainable sources of energy.
A second point concerns the extent to which the definition
of energy security may be framed to reflect a country’s (or
continent’s) energy use ‘mix’, the abundance of local resources
and reliance on imports. This is illustrated by the EC’s 2006
Green Paper A European strategy for sustainable, competitive
and secure energy. The document places a far stronger
emphasis on the physical security of supply (network
infrastructure, stock, diversification of supplies) than the
Green Paper of six years earlier. The objective of supply
security, now separated from sustainability, is targeted at
“tackling the EU’s rising dependence on imported energy”
[31: 18] which is projected to rise to around 70% of energy
requirements in the next 20 to 30 years. This dependence is to
be ‘tackled’ by a number of policy measures such as reducing
demand, diversification of the energy mix and supply sources,
stimulating investment in adequate capacity, emergency
preparedness, and improved energy access for business and
citizens. The clear priority of ‘energy security’ is to minimise
the EU’s import vulnerability, supply shortfalls and potential
supply uncertainty given the high dependence on one single
gas supplier [32].
Third, the term ‘energy security’ clearly reflects a concept
and has some form of strategic intent. This view is exemplified
by the following definition developed by the Centre for
European Policy Studies: “security of supply consists of a
variety of approaches aimed at insuring against supply risks.
Security of supply becomes a cost-effective risk-management
strategy of governments, firms and consumers” [33: 3,
emphasis added]. The latter point about responsibility or
carriage of the strategy is contestable and goes beyond the
purposes of the current discussion. The salient point is that
energy security is a concept with strategic intent. Energy
security is not a policy per se. Specific policy measures are
implemented by governments to achieve the objective of
energy security, however defined, and these policy measures
have increasingly included reliance on competitive markets,
the creation of new regulatory regimes to support those
markets, and ‘geopolitical approaches’ [34].
Fourth, the concept of energy security has a temporal
dimension. The risks or threats to physical supply differ across
short and long term horizons. Short-term risks include extreme
weather conditions, accidents, terrorism attacks, or technical
failure. The main issue of concern is the reliability and
continuity of available technological and commercial
mechanisms which convert primary energy sources for end-use
by consumers. Long-term risks concern the adequacy of supply
to meet demand and the adequacy of infrastructure to deliver
supply to markets which will, in turn, depend on levels of
investment and contracting, the development of technology
and the availability of primary energy sources [35]. Therefore
the meaning attributed to energy security will differ across
time because the probability, likelihood and consequences of
different risks or threats to supply will vary over time.
A further aspect concerns the differences between energy
markets. There are significant differences between the oil, gas,
nuclear and electricity energy markets such as the rigidity of
transport infrastructure, the difficulties of storage, and the
regional nature of markets [14]. Consequently, to apply the
concept of energy security to the gas market will result in a
different meaning than if applied to the oil market or the
electricity market. These security-of-supply differences across
energy markets were recognised by the IEA’s 1995 gas study.
They also are affirmed by the UK Government’s decision to
develop separate sets of security-of-supply indicators for each
energy market.
A final aspect about energy security is possibly the most
significant given the implications for the policy role and
actions of governments. As we have seen, a definition of
energy security may contain both absolute and relative notions.
Availability and adequacy of capacity are capable of absolute
measurement. Affordability, or the ‘reasonableness’ of prices,
are relative notions with meanings subject to considerable
variation. Supra-national organisations, governments, policy
advisers and commentators generally favour a definition of
energy security narrowly centred on the absolute notions of
market supply and market price. Broader definitions, such as
those used by the EC, encompass absolute and relative notions.
All definitions envisage the market playing a central role in
ensuring, enhancing or attaining energy security. However,
what is the market paradigm underpinning these definitions?
Two competing market paradigms are evident within
contemporary economic thought: the pure Walrasian market
which optimally allocates products in a perfectly informed,
atomistic world; or the market which is a social, political and
historical construct [36]-[37]. Each paradigm defines the
interrelationship between market and state, and thus the role to
be played by policy to deal with matters such as ‘energy
security’.
The narrower market-centric definition of energy security
clearly is based on the pure Walrasian market with its self-
equilibrating properties. Markets are assumed to clear
automatically via price adjustments i.e. prices respond to
changes in demand or supply, finding equilibrium at the price
at which the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded.
These oscillations, according to this paradigm, underpin a
systemic stability across markets for all goods and services and
ensure an optimal allocation of resources between competing
needs. Yet this self-equilibrating nature of the market rests on
numerous assumptions such as identical consumers behaving
rationally because they are perfectly informed about all the
available alternatives, zero transaction costs, no trading at
disequilibrium prices, and infinitely rapid velocities of prices
and quantities [38: 40-41].
Notwithstanding any perceived incompatibility of these
assumptions with economic reality, this paradigm maintains
that the market should be left ‘unfettered’ from state
interventions – left pure – to ensure its ‘efficient’ workings are
allowed to determine output and price. The market-centric
definition of energy security is couched in these market terms
of output (supply) and price and “energy security policies
should be mostly aimed at ‘making markets work’ and letting
them work when they do” [22]. This approach strongly
advocates a limited role for governments and policy. Energy
markets should be allowed to operate ‘freely’. Competitively
determined output and prices should be the energy security
objectives of governments. Adequacy of capacity, affordability
and sustainability will be by-products of an ‘unfettered’ market
but the sacrosanct objectives of competitive output and prices
will be jeopardised if governments intervene in the pursuit of
lower-order objectives.
Not surprisingly, a different view is held by the alternative
market paradigm which situates the market as one of a
multiplicity of formal and informal institutions comprising
capitalism. “All institutions, including the market … are
defined in relation to the structure of the rights and obligations
of the relevant actors” [36: 7] which in the case of the market
includes the institutional arrangements that determine and/or
regulate market participants, and the objects and process of
market exchange. As these ‘rights and obligations’ are deemed
to be the result of politics, the market – like all institutions – is
considered to be a political construct. Property rights, and the
entitlements bestowed on market participants are not free of
politics, nor are the determination of interest rates and wages
which impact on every sector of the economy, along with
numerous state actions to ‘protect’ market participants. Far
from being ‘natural’, “markets are the fruit of complex social
and historical developments” [37: 1] with politics, and thus the
state, being integral to their creation and functioning.
Consequently, the institutionalist paradigm assigns a far
more active role to the state in relation to the market. Market
outcomes result from a myriad of institutional arrangements
and processes all of which are influenced by the state and
politics. Accordingly, a view of market outcomes solely in
terms of output and price provides a partial and thus inaccurate
view, of reality. The corollary of this paradigm is that energy
markets need to be considered through a multi-dimensional
lens which goes beyond the absolute market notions of output
and price to include notions such as adequacy of capacity to
meet demand, affordability and sustainability. This approach is
more consistent with the European definitions of energy
security.
D. The implications of energy security’ specificities
The discussion has shown multiple meanings can be
attributed (and have been) to the term ‘energy security’. Its
meaning may be used to convey absolute and relative notions
denoting dimensions of availability, adequacy of capacity,
affordability and/or sustainability. Those favouring a narrow
market-centric definition place an almost exclusive priority on
the absolute dimension of availability i.e. physical supply
(although notions around ‘adequate capacity’ may be
mentioned) and affordability is eschewed, not only due to its
inherent relativity but because it is generally assumed that
market price reflects energy availability and thus the cost of
security of supply [39]. Possibly the narrowest market-centric
definition of energy security is that posited by [22] as energy
availability “to those willing to pay the market price”.
The adoption by government of a narrow market-based or
broader multi-dimensional definition of energy security is an
unequivocal signal of its intended role in the pursuit of energy
security objectives. Energy market outcomes are either viewed
purely in absolute market terms or more broadly. If the latter,
governments may wish to intervene to ‘adjust’ the market
outcome.
The discussion has also shown that energy security is a
concept and policies may be directed at implementing its
strategic intent which often is framed in terms of: (1) the
management of perceived risk(s) – to avoid supply disruption,
insufficient capacity, unaffordability, and reliance on
unsustainable energy sources, and/or (2) a country’s energy
use mix and reliance on local resources or imports. The time
horizon adds a further layer of complexity to the meaning of
energy security because whatever dimensions are used to
define the term, the risks or threats to those dimensions will
differ in the short term from the long term. Finally, the
heterogeneity between energy markets means that the
application of the concept will result in different meanings for
different energy sources.
These findings lead to the contention that the concept of
‘energy security’ is inherently slippery because it is polysemic
in nature. The concept has many possible meanings. Energy
security may be delineated through multiple dimensions and
takes on different specificities depending on the country (or
continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied.
Traditionally many problems for policy makers could be
resolved by the systematic application of technical expertise
[40]. But contemporary governments around the world have
increasingly confronted very complex problems, problems so
complex that they have been termed ‘wicked’ because of being
seemingly intractable or highly resistant to resolution. These
problems require new ways of thinking and pose substantive
challenges to governance structures, skills bases and
organisational capacities [41]. Given the polysemic layering in
which energy security is swathed, does this make it a ‘wicked’
problem?
III. IS ENERGY SECURITY A WICKED PROBLEM?
Rittel and Webber [42] observed that a range of planning
problems were not amenable to being treated with traditional,
linear analytical approaches denoted by the sequential top-
down process of problem definition, data collection, analysis,
formulation of a solution and implementation. This logic of
working from the problem to the solution is common and
familiar. The starting point is an understanding of the problem.
After the problem is specified and its dimensions analysed, a
solution is formulated followed by implementation.
Policy problems not amenable to such treatment have been
designated ‘wicked’ not “in the sense of [being] evil, but as a
cross-word puzzle addict or a mathematician would use it –
suggesting an issue (or problem) difficult to resolve” [43: 1].
Wicked problems are distinguishable from ‘tame’ or ‘benign’
problems. Tame problems are not necessarily simple and can
be very technically complex. But these are problems that can
be more readily defined and a solution more easily identified.
Many of the policy challenges confronting governments today
are complex, contested and seem intractable despite
considerable resources allocated to resolve them. There is no
obvious or easily found solution. These are wicked problems.
Examples of these policy challenges include climate change,
terrorism, obesity, poverty, and indigenous disadvantage. Can
energy security also be designated a wicked problem?
Wicked problems are distinguishable by multiple
characteristics although not all need to be displayed for a
problem to be deemed as wicked. The generally agreed
common characteristics of wicked problems cited in the
literature are: difficulty of clear problem definition; no clear
solution; solutions are good-or-bad not right-or-wrong;
unintended consequences arise from solutions; inability to
implement solutions by trial-and-error; infinite solutions;
uniqueness; solutions involve multiple organisations and
governments; and, behavioural changes are often required to
solve wicked problems [41]-[49].
These characteristics do not categorise a given problem as
wicked or not per se. Rather these characteristics provide
policymakers with “a sense of what contributes to the
‘wickedness’ of a problem” [44: 16, emphasis added]. We
will now consider each of these characteristics in turn,
although it will be seen that they are strongly interrelated, and
assess whether any can be attributed to energy security in light
of its qualities found earlier. I am not aware of any previous
assessment to determine if energy security is a wicked
problem. Paquet [46] assessed the suitability of a research
method based on social learning to energy policy. He assumed
from the outset that ‘energy policy poses a wicked problem’
because of inherently similar characteristics to wicked
problems and he did not conduct a ‘wickedness’ assessment.
A. There is no definitive formulation of the problem
The nature and extent of a wicked problem varies depending
on who is asked. Different stakeholders have different views
about the nature of the problem and thus, the nature of what
represents a satisfactory solution. Each proffered solution
presents different aspects of the problem because “every
specification of the problem is a specification of the direction
in which a treatment [solution] is considered” [42: 161]. In
other words, the formulation or specification of a wicked
problem is the problem. To define the problem is the
equivalent of finding a solution. The problem cannot be
defined without reference to a solution but there will be
different versions of the solution and thus, different views of
the problem because of the different perspectives held by
stakeholders.
A very contemporary illustration of this characteristic of a
wicked problem is the debate concerning the causes and
solutions to climate change. According to Thompson and
Verweij [50], the climate change debate can be distilled into
three competing versions – profligacy, lack of global planning,
and much ado about nothing. Each version emphasises
different aspects and proposes different solutions. Each
version presents a plausible but different explanation of
climate change. None are completely right and none are
completely wrong. Each focuses on a partial aspect of the
debate [41: 5].
With respect to energy security, the earlier discussion
delineated the use of two broad definitions. One definition is
framed narrowly around the market-centric terms of output
(supply) and price. This definition is based on the paradigm of
a pure Walrasian market with its self-equilibrating properties.
Markets are assumed to clear automatically through price
responding to demand or supply changes. Accordingly,
competitive markets and ‘independent’ regulation are
considered to be the most effective solution to delivering
secure and reliable energy. This conceptualisation sees a
limited role for governments and policy.
The alternative definition of energy security, we saw,
embraces dimensions other than market supply and market
price such as adequacy of capacity, availability, affordability
and sustainability. This definition is underpinned by a different
market paradigm which situates the market as one of
capitalism’s multiplicity of institutions and considers an active
interventionist state to be integral to the creation and
functioning of energy markets. Hence, energy security – in this
case - is viewed as a market outcome resulting from
institutional arrangements and processes orchestrated by the
actions and policies of the state not the result of self-
equilibrating forces.
Thus we have two different formulations of the problem of
energy security and two different approaches to the solution.
This is consistent with the first characteristic of wicked
problems.
There is another feature of energy security which also meets
the criterion of ‘no definitive formulation of the problem’. We
have seen that energy security can assume different
specificities. The nature of the problem can be expressed in
terms of a country, a continent, a region, end-users or even a
particular energy market. The problem of energy security for a
country with high import dependence will be defined far
differently, as will be the policy solution, than that for an end-
user such as a household. Fuel diversification, a geographic
spread of energy supply sources and a reduced dependence on
particular energy sources could possibly dictate the proposed
solution to a country’s energy security. In comparison, the
energy security of a northern hemisphere household may be
described in terms of the availability and affordability of
reliable energy sources for cooking and heating. Alternatively,
the security of electricity supply could be characterised around
the availability and cost of fuel sources, generation capacity,
transmission and distribution infrastructure and market
operations. Each is a different conceptualisation of the
problem of energy security, and its solution. This meets the
first criterion of wicked problems to have ‘no definitive
problem formulation’.
B. There is no absolute or clear solution to the problem
The second characteristic of wicked problems is partly a
corollary of the first. If there is no definitive formulation of a
wicked problem, there can be no clear or absolute solution or a
clear end point to its resolution.
The priority afforded a wicked problem may vary over time
not for reasons inherent to the problem but due to external
considerations such as the exhaustion of resources applied to
the problem or a change to the political priorities of
government. But this does not mean that the wicked problem
has been eliminated. Such is the nature of its complexity and
difficulties of definition that a wicked problem may never be
completely solved or eliminated (e.g. illicit drug use). Wicked
problems persist, they are intractable and subject to
redefinition because its nature evolves over time as
governments implement policy actions to address the problem
[45: 6].
Just as the first wicked problem characteristic has
applicability to energy security so does the second
characteristic. The multiplicity of meanings that can be
attributed to energy security establishes that there can be no
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. For example, the policy measures
designed to reduce a country’s energy import dependence will
differ considerably from the policy measures aimed at
improving energy affordability. Both can be denoted as
dimensions or aspects of energy security but each requires
considerably different policy formulation, policy instruments
and implementation given the vast difference in the nature and
scale of impact sought.
The temporal dimension of energy security also signals the
impossibility of an absolute or clear end-state solution. It was
noted earlier that the meaning of energy security will differ
over the short, medium and long term because the probability,
likelihood and consequences of different risks or threats to
supply will vary over time. Thus we will never reach an end-
state of energy security as such. An analogous situation is the
process of competition. Firms continually seek to create and
maintain the best conditions for their profitability. To do this,
firms will continually seek out and exploit differences in
technology, production, distribution, access to information and
consumption trends. It is an ongoing never-ending process.
Likewise policymakers and governments will take actions
seeking to remove the obstacles deemed to be preventing
energy security. But the factors influencing energy security,
however it is defined, are constantly changing. Hence, an end-
state of energy security is never reached because it is an
evolving allegory with multiple meanings. Energy security
meets the second criterion of wicked problems.
C. Solutions to problems are not right-or-wrong
This third wicked problem characteristic logically follows
from the second. We have already seen that different
stakeholders hold different views about what is a wicked
problem and thus, what will constitute an acceptable solution.
Similarly, given the complexity of wicked problems,
stakeholders will judge the solutions to wicked problems
differently. These judgements will reflect their respective
interests and positions, and will be expressed in relative terms
such as ‘good’, ‘bad, ‘better’, ‘worse’, ‘good enough’ or ‘not
good enough’. For wicked problems, there are no right or
wrong solutions. For wicked problems, there are no
conventionalised criteria (like the formula for a chemical
compound) against which solutions can be evaluated and an
unambiguous answer derived.
We previously observed that an end-state of energy
security is not possible given that constantly changing factors
shape its multiple meanings and temporal dimensions although
policies will be implemented to remove perceived obstacles
preventing energy security. It was also noted earlier that
definitions of energy security may contain the relative and/or
absolute notions of sustainability, affordability, availability
and the adequacy of capacity. The latter refers to the net
outcome of demand for energy and the capacity available to
provide energy in response to that demand. Policies designed
to improve the adequacy of capacity may include demand
management and energy efficiency programs, taxation and
other incentives to stimulate investment in renewable energy
sources to provide additional electricity generation capacity,
along with other measures. Governments will evaluate the
efficacy of each policy measure to determine, amongst other
things, if it has improved the adequacy of capacity through, for
example, a reduction in the growth rate of the demand for
energy or the amount of additional capacity to existing energy
infrastructure. Yet there will be divergent views about the
effectiveness of these policy measures because there is not a
common definition of the problem or solution, and thus
different criteria will be used to assess the outcomes of policy
measures.
Having met the first wicked problem characteristic, it is
probably not surprising that energy security meets the second
and third characteristics given that these logically flow from
the first characteristic.
D. Solutions will often lead to unforeseen consequences
For tame problems, the effectiveness of a solution can be
easily tested. For wicked problems which are multi-casual with
many interconnections to other issues, solutions to address the
problem commonly lead to unforeseen consequences
elsewhere over an extended period of time. These
consequences may outweigh the intended advantages of the
solution. Yet it is not possible to appraise these consequences
until “the waves of repercussion have completely run out, and
we have no way of tracing all the waves through all the
affected lives ahead of time or within a limited time span” [42:
163]. Moreover unintended consequences will, in every
probability, spawn new wicked problems.
It was noted earlier that the world’s escalating
consumption of fossil fuels is the key contributor to the
problem of greenhouse gas emissions (GGE). Energy security
strategies of the 1970s placed a very strong emphasis on
reducing dependencies on oil as a primary energy source. The
world’s oil appetite did not abate, growing strongly along with
a rapidly accelerating use of other fossil fuels. The
environmental ramifications of GGE are only now beginning
to be addressed at a global level. GGE are a highly tangible
consequence of energy use. Energy security solutions pursued
in the late twentieth century did not address these
environmental ramifications. Twenty-first century energy
security strategies, of for example the EU, are endeavouring to
reduce the rate of emissions growth and its absolute level.
Another ‘consequence’ of policy solutions designed to
improve energy security concerns the global restructuring of
electricity sectors. A core feature of this restructuring has been
a far greater reliance on the market to determine investment
outcomes. The level of wholesale electricity prices is claimed
to signal the need for investment in additional generation
capacity. However, it has been found that high wholesale
prices have not stimulated investment to expected levels in
base-load generation capacity because of policy uncertainty
about emission trading or other forms of GGE abatement
schemes [51]-[53].
A further example of consequences also comes from
electricity sector restructuring. The proclaimed objectives of
this restructuring included lower consumer prices. However,
there is increasing evidence that lower electricity prices for
households have not occurred. Some have experienced
increases of up to 60%, and increasing proportions of
disposable income are required to meet higher electricity bills
with considerable hardship being incurred by low-income
consumers [54][55]. Governments have subsequently
introduced additional policy measures to redress this
‘unintended consequence’ such as the UK Fuel Poverty
Strategy [56].
These three examples demonstrate consequences arising
from policies intended to improve energy security and
consequences which were at odds to the intended outcomes of
these policy actions. However, it is more difficult to conclude
these were all unintended consequences. An absence of policy
action 30 years ago to address GGE does not mean that
policymakers were ignorant of the occurrence of these
emissions. It does signal it was not a political priority at that
time given the absence of policy attention. It also signals a lack
of knowledge – at that time – of the long-term impact and
scale of environmental degradation caused by rapidly
escalating fossil fuel use compared to our understanding now.
‘Unintended consequences’ would seem to be an inevitability
of lack of knowledge.
Our second example, of investment in electricity base-
load generation capacity being stymied by policy uncertainty
concerning GGE, signals that policymakers had a narrow
understanding of the critical influences on investment
decisions in this particular form of infrastructure. Policy
myopia may have led to unintended consequences rather than
the solution to the wicked problem per se.
An analogous issue is apparent with respect to our third
example of significant increases in household electricity
prices. Electricity sectors have been restructured to create
competitive markets which, according to the underlying
theory, provide the most efficient allocation of resources.
Lower prices were heralded as an expected outcome. There is
evidence of lower prices for some consumers – business – but
not for the household sector. Criticisms of the substantial
increases in household electricity prices have been rebuffed by
restructuring advocates with arguments such as ‘the prices now
reflect a truer cost of supply’ and thus a more efficient
allocation of resources [2: 252-59]. These price increases for
households were not foreshadowed prior to the restructuring in
stark comparison to the detailed estimates released of the
projected impacts on household electricity prices of emissions
trading [For example, 57]. To suggest this could have been an
unintended consequence of electricity sector restructuring
would be disingenuous. Price impacts were foreshadowed by
policymakers but not negative ones.
This discussion highlights the difficulty in concluding that
solutions to the problem of energy security have led to
unintended consequences as is alleged to occur from the
solutions to wicked problems. These consequences may well
occur. Further evaluation is required to reach a more definitive
conclusion with respect to energy security.
E. Solutions cannot be implemented by trial and error
According to [42], there is no opportunity to learn by trial-
and-error with solutions to wicked problems. Every
implemented solution for a wicked problem is consequential.
The solutions leave ‘traces’ and are effectively irreversible, a
good example of which is large-scale infrastructure projects.
Solutions are expensive due to the complexity, multi-causal
nature and interconnectedness of the problem.
Nuclear power plants would seem to exemplify this
wicked problem characteristic. Conceived as a solution to
improve the security of energy supply, nuclear plants provide
around 16 per cent of the world’s electricity generation
capacity. They are very expensive to build with construction
times increasing from around 6 years in the 1970s to nearly 10
years by the turn of the century. Construction costs around the
world have consistently exceeded budget, in some cases by
300%. Decommissioning and waste disposal takes the
equivalent of many times the plant life [currently more than
100 years], the costs of which have also risen exponentially.
Production costs generally fall over time due to technological
improvements, economies of scale and efficiency
improvements. However, the rate at which this has occurred
for nuclear power has been much lower than all other
technologies [58], [59]. On the other hand, nuclear power
plants emit considerably less greenhouse gas than coal or oil
fired power plants which starts to change the comparative
costs of electricity with the introduction of emission trading
schemes as well as be more compatible with environmental
policy objectives.
The cost and lead time of construction make nuclear
power plants an expensive commitment. Like all major capital
projects, a point of ‘no return’ is reached in the construction
phase where the costs of cessation significantly outweigh the
costs of proceeding. Upon completion the project may not
yield the projected benefits as has occurred with the changing
economics of nuclear plants notwithstanding the more recently
perceived environmental benefits of nuclear power.
Decommissioning and waste disposal are two very tangible
outcomes of nuclear power that are ‘irreversible’.
Another possible energy security example which falls
within the ambit of this wicked problem characteristic is the
creation of the UK electricity wholesale trading pool. This was
to be the primary market for trading electricity. All electricity
generated had to be sold via the pool. Eleven years after
commencement, due to a number of reasons, the pool was
replaced with a trading system based on bilateral contracts.
The cost, to the UK government, of establishing and operating
the trading pool for the first five years was £726 million. The
cost to develop and operate the replacement trading system
over its first five years has been estimated at £1 billion [60].
Apart from being costly, this policy change was tantamount to
a 180 degree turn and thus cannot be labelled policy
incrementalism, of making changes to existing programs [61].
There was no turning back to operating the UK electricity
sector to ‘the way it was’ because a number of concurrent
changes such as de-integration and privatisation ensured the
sector’s structure bore little resemblance to that of pre-trading
pool days.
Markets for the wholesale trading of electricity have
become a core feature of restructured electricity sectors around
the world since the early 1990s [2: 16-26]. Despite some
design and operational differences, these markets have now
become inextricable to the operation of this industry sector and
the electricity supply chain. Considerable resources of
government have been expended in their creation and ongoing
regulation. As in the case of the UK and the high profile
example of the Californian electricity market [62], should
these electricity markets change in any way there will be no
return to the circumstances which prevailed prior to their
inception. The operation of these wholesale markets has led to
an array of other significant structural changes such as market
consolidation and concentration, the regulation of monopoly
functions, the re-integration of generation and retail activities,
and the trading of electricity derivatives to hedge the risk of
price volatility in electricity wholesale markets. These
changes are consequential to the creation of wholesale
electricity markets and cannot be reversed should there be any
alteration to the wholesale trading of electricity.
Nuclear power plants and wholesale electricity markets
do illustrate that solutions implemented for the purpose of
‘solving’ energy security can have consequences, be very
expensive, leave ‘traces’ and are effectively irreversible.
Therefore energy security also meets this characteristic of
wicked problems.
F. Infinite solutions
“There are no criteria which enable one to prove that all
solutions to wicked problems have been identified and
considered” [42: 164]. Policymakers consider a range of
potential solutions in the pursuit of wicked problems. But
many solutions are not even contemplated because there are an
infinite number of solutions. It is a matter of judgement for
policymakers to determine if the ‘set of solutions’ considered
should be expanded. It is also a matter of judgement by
policymakers and decision makers which solutions are the
most feasible to be pursued and implemented.
This wicked problem characteristic logically follows from
the earlier discussed characteristics of no definitive problem
formulation and thus, no absolute or clear solution to the
problem. If a problem can be conceptualised in different ways,
as we have seen with energy security, there will be multiple
solutions. These solutions will be innumerable when
multiplicity of problem definition prevails.
G. Each wicked problem is unique
There are so many factors and conditions contributing to the
complexity of a wicked problem that no two wicked problems
are alike, and the solutions to them will be tailored to meet the
unique nature of each.
There are no classes of wicked problems in the sense that
principles of solution can be developed to fit all members of a
class ... Despite seeming similarities among wicked problems,
one can never be certain that the particulars of a problem do
not override its commonalities with other problems already
dealt with [42: 164-65, original emphasis].
A problem analogous to energy security is that of food
security. There is a longstanding and wide-ranging discourse
about food security fused around notions of availability,
affordability, accessibility and utilisation [63]-[66]. Food
security solutions are directed at a complex system which
encompasses: those who grow or catch food; the physical
environment; food processing, packaging, distribution and
marketing; food wholesalers and storage; the transportation
system; the retailing of food; places where food is served such
as health or penal institutions; the political and economic
environment; the health care system, the workforce, schools
and technology; and everyone who consumes food. The word
‘energy’ could easily be substituted for ‘food’ in this system
description and the result would be a very accurate depiction
of the complex of system elements which impact on, and are
impacted by, energy security. Yet the same ‘substitution’ is
meaningless when it comes to the causes of food insecurity and
proposed solutions notwithstanding that energy security may
also have dimensions such as availability, affordability,
accessibility and sustainability.
The multiple causes of food insecurity include:
insufficient economic resources and lack of a political voice;
poor water resources and environmental degradation; unequal
gender access to education, training, land ownership and
credit; population growth and urbanisation; trade barriers; and
droughts, floods, cyclones and pests [67]. Solutions are framed
around national and global strategies to improve food
production, economic growth and trade liberalisation, policy
and behavioural changes, gender equality and food aid. Yet the
solutions recommended to overcome food insecurity cannot be
replicated as solutions for energy security given the very
unique specificities of each. We saw earlier that the multiple
dimensions of energy security can be reflected through
different specificities depending on the country (or continent),
timeframe or energy source to which it is applied. It is to these
unique specificities that solutions to the problem of energy
security are directed just as food security solutions are directed
to its particular specificities. Each concept is able to be
defined in similar relative and absolute dimensions but their
specificities are peculiar to each. Consequently, it can be
concluded that the solutions to the problem of energy security
are unique. This satisfies another characteristic of wicked
problems.
H. Solutions involve multiple organisations and whole-of-
government approaches
Wicked problems require holistic rather than linear thinking
given their complexity and multi-causal factors [43]. This
complexity, causality and interconnectedness also mean that
wicked problems defy ‘organisational neatness’ and require a
capacity to work across organisational and governance
boundaries. The effectiveness of solutions will be maximised
by crossing organisational boundaries and adopting whole-of-
government approaches at local, national and international
levels although over a sustained period this can be
complicated, costly and difficult to effect [41: 17-19]. Inter-
organisational, whole-of-government and inter-government
working is not easily achieved given that each organization or
government has its own priorities and ways of working which
may limit the willingness or commitment to tackling the
wicked problem apart from the obvious issue of coordination
[43].
The restructuring of energy sectors to improve energy
security displays features strongly indicative of this wicked
problem characteristic. For example, the EU’s electricity and
gas sectors have been transformed by a number of policy
directives requiring all 27 member countries to implement a
range of structural changes such as separation of competitive
and monopoly functions, introduction of retail competition,
provision of third party access to monopoly networks, creation
of wholesale trading markets and national energy regulators,
application of minimum operating standards, monitoring of
capacity and demand as well as preparation of national
network investment plans for regulatory approval [68]-[73].
Each EU member country has been required to implement
these changes through their respective national laws. In
addition, the EC established a European Regulators Group to
ensure inter alia consistent application and timely
implementation of the policy directives across all member
countries [74], [75]. Regular reports have publicly reported
progress and issues arising [76]-[79]. The restructuring
process is continuing after more than a decade. The timeline
alone points to the inherent complexity of the changes
implemented. Moreover, the difficulties of achieving
consistent and concurrent implementation across nearly 30
national governments, reflected in the lack of uniformity and
unification, led to policy changes, an inquiry into the gas and
electricity markets and further legislative packages designed to
achieve greater competitiveness, sustainability and security of
supply [32], [80].
A similar situation is evident in the restructuring of other
electricity sectors such as Australia, a country of similar land
mass to Europe and the United States but with a far lower
population density. The Australian sector’s restructuring was
first mooted in the early 1990s and through a series of inter-
governmental agreements, involving all six States and two
Territories, the restructuring was the cornerstone to a nearly
decade-long program of measures to implement a national
competition policy. Former government monopolies were
broken up into multiple companies, sales of former
government businesses contributed significantly to one of the
world’s largest privatisation programs, a mandatory national
electricity market has been operating since late 1998, retail
contestability for all electricity consumers has been
progressively introduced, and new national and State
government regulatory authorities have been established [2:
32-46]. However, government inquiries in 2002 and 2006 were
instigated to examine the impediments to energy market
reform leading to regulatory regime changes to eliminate
perceived obstacles, improve competitiveness and accelerate
the changes agreed by all Australian governments [51]. Like
the EU, the process of reform has involved a multiplicity of
governments and organisations. The most heavily populated
States on the eastern seaboard and the southern part of the
continent have formed the national electricity market but a
plethora of local political issues have led to State-by-State
timetables for the introduction of critical structural changes.
The western and northern jurisdictions have been required to
mimic, to the extent possible, the changes of the other States
because geographic remoteness precludes national market
integration.
It could be argued that the problems experienced with
electricity sector restructuring are solely due to the sheer
number of organisations and governments engaged in the
reforms and the consequential inherent coordination
difficulties that this brings. But such an argument overlooks
the fundamental reason for the involvement of so many
institutions. The sectoral restructurings deemed to contribute
pivotal short and long term solutions to energy security could
not be achieved by one organisation or one level of
government. The solution required inter-organisational and
inter-government agreement, co-operation and active
participation over a period extending to more than a decade.
This is strongly symptomatic of the eighth characteristic of
wicked problems, namely solutions requiring multiple
organisation and government approaches.
I. Solutions often involve changing behaviour
Governments use a range of policy instruments to achieve
desired changes. These policy instruments are the “set of
techniques by which government authorities wield their
power” [81: 21] and “to shape our lives … to suit a variety of
purposes” [82: 2]. Policy instruments are forms of intervention
by government aimed at the behaviour of citizens, firms and
other organisations. These instruments may take one of three
broad forms:
 regulation – rules and directives which require certain
behaviour and may include the threat of negative sanctions
such as fines or some form of punishment. These are
mandatory rules of conduct;
 economic – involve either the handing out or taking
away of material resources. These may be monetary or
non-monetary forms such as grants, rebates or refunds.
Economic policy instruments do not prescribe or prohibit
particular behaviour. These instruments make types of
behaviour more or less expensive; and
 information – influences behaviour through
knowledge transfer, communication of reasoned argument
and persuasion. No obligation or coercion is involved.
Information may be about the nature of the problem, how
people are handling a problem, measures to change a
situation or reasons to adopt measures.
The solutions to many wicked problems involve sustained
behavioural changes requiring a mix of policy instruments
[41], [43].
What behavioural changes may be required to address the
problem of energy security? One example is evident from our
earlier discussion of the concept of energy security. The
definition of energy security may be framed in terms of a
continent’s energy use mix and its reliance on imports. The EC
has developed an energy security strategy to minimise the
EU’s vulnerability of a high reliance on gas imports and ensure
sufficient supply through policies such as demand
management, energy supply diversification, stimulation of
investment in adequate capacity, improved energy access and
emergency preparedness [31], [32], [80].
The effectiveness of these policies requires sustained
behavioural changes by all participants in the energy sector be
they government institutions, producers, distributors, retailers
or users. Consequently, a range of policy instruments have
been applied. These include inter alia: an information
campaign on energy consumer rights; directives requiring
member countries to maintain minimum energy stocks, to
improve the energy efficiency of all new and existing
buildings, to label energy efficiency information on all
industrial, commercial and household products; to develop
cogeneration of heat and power; the provision of information
about the benefits to member countries of regional offshore
wind energy initiatives; the setting of targets for renewable
energy’s share of total energy use; and, reporting of obstacles
and intended actions by the EC to achieve a competitive
internal energy market by regulation. Member countries have
subsequently responded with a range of their own policy
measures such as separation of electricity generation,
transmission and retail functions, the introduction of retail
contestability for electricity and gas, product labelling of
energy efficiency, solar power feed-in tariffs to encourage
takeup, tax exemptions for biofuels to stimulate expansion, and
funding for the development of renewable energy technologies
and integration with the existing electricity transmission grid.
Although the above description of policy instruments is a
very truncated summary, it does illustrate the various types of
instruments used to instigate a long-term shift in the behaviour
of a range of energy sector participants as part of the EU’s
energy security strategy. It also illustrates that another wicked
problem characteristic can be applied to the problem of energy
security.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the concept of ‘energy security’ has
found it to be inherently slippery, being able to assume a range
of meanings and thus polysemic in nature. A subsequent
assessment against the commonly-cited characteristics of
wicked problems found strong affirmation that energy security
is a wicked problem.
Wicked problems are characterised as being difficult to
define, having many interdependencies, being multi-causal,
leading to unforeseen consequences, evolving as steps are
being taken to address it, having no clear solution, being
complex, being the responsibility of more than one institution
or government, involve changing behaviour and/or being
seemingly intractable. A tame problem, on the other hand, has
a well-defined and stable statement of problem, has a definite
point when the solution is reached, has a solution capable of
objective evaluation as right or wrong, belongs to a class of
similar problems able to be solved in similar ways, has
solutions that can be trialled and abandoned, and has a limited
set of alternative solutions.
This means that traditional, linear analytical approaches
and the systematic application of technical expertise are
inappropriate policy responses to tackle the problem of energy
security. This wicked problem requires different ways of
thinking and poses challenges to governance structures, skills
bases and organisational capacities. Unless this is recognised
by governments, decision-makers and policymakers, policies
designed to deliver energy security will be ineffectual.
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